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Corporation Executive Committees
Nancy F. Halliday*
S OON AFTER it had been determined by the courts that man-
agement functions could be delegated by corporation boards
of directors,1 it became a frequent practice in business and non-
profit corporations to delegate these functions to a small, active
group of directors, known as the executive committee.2 Boards
of directors cannot be expected to be in session continually, and
certainly the affairs of a corporation require constant super-
vision by some directing body. 3 This paper is particularly con-
cerned with consideration of the extent to which the managerial
function of the board of directors can be properly delegated to
an executive committee.
Development of Delegable Functions
It was recognized very early that the delegation of at least
routine ministerial functions to executive committees was neces-
sary for smooth and efficient management of the corporation.4
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1 Hoyt v. Thompson's Exr., 19 N. Y. 207 (1859); Haldeman v. Haldeman,
176 Ky. 635, 197 S. W. 376 (1917); Maryland Trust Co. v. National Me-
chanics' Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 A. 70 (1906); Sheridan Electric Light Co. v.
Chatham Natl. Bank, 127 N. Y. 517, 28 N. E. 467 (1891); Young v. Canada
A. & P. S.S. Co., 211 Mass. 453, 97 N. E. 1098 (1912); Tempel v. Dodge, 89
Tex. 68, 32 S. W. 514 (1895); Ballantine, Corporations, 133 (rev. ed. 1946);
19 C. J. S., Corporations, Sec. 758 (1940).
2 Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Ry. Co., 163 U. S.
564, 41 L. Ed. 265 (1895); Sheridan Electric Light Co. v. Chatham Nat. Bank,
supra n. 1; Henn, Corporations, 343 (1961); Comment, 42 Mich. L. Rev. 133
(1943). This applies also to non-profit corporations as well as to business
corporations: see, Oleck, Non-Profit Corporations, Organizations & Assns.,
Secs. 184, 187 (2d ed., 1965).
3 Ballantine, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 132; 2 Oleck, Modem Corporation Law, 728
(1959 with 1965 suppl.); Comment, ibid.
4 Black River Improvement Co. v. Holway, 85 Wis. 344, 55 N. W. 418 (1893)
(Committee could be delegated the authority to fix the toll rates for driv-
ing of logs); Round Lake Ass'n. v. Kellogg, 141 N. Y. 348, 36 N. E. 326
(1894); John A. Roebling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction & Power
Co., 76 Vt. 131, 56 A. 530, 531 (1903) (The court stated that the principle
that a board of directors is the depositary of discretionary powers to be
exercised by the board itself, and not to be delegated by it to any smaller
body, even of its own members, is entirely consistent with the other prin-
ciple that it may delegate authority to perform such duties as are required
in the usual and ordinary course of its business); Fensterer v. Pressure
Lighting Co., 85 Misc. 621, 149 N. Y. S. 49 (1914) (Authorized delegation of
ministerial, current, ordinary and routine powers); Hughes v. Cleveland
Trucking Co., 2 Ohio L. Abs. 614 (Ct. App. 1924); Ohio Valley Nat. Bank
(Continued on next page)
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In the case of Fensterer v. Pressure Lighting Co.5 a statute which
delegated "management of the business and affairs of the com-
pany" to the executive committee was construed by the court to
mean only "ministerial, current, ordinary and routine powers"
and the committee was not authorized to institute any major
changes in the policies originally established by the board of
directors. The executive committee in Tempel v. Dodge6 was
delegated the "full powers of the board." Here an officer and
one director of the Pacific Railway Improvement Company agreed
with the plaintiff's attorney to sue for the recovery of certain
land, of which the plaintiff was to receive half. This contract was
later approved by the executive committee, but never by the
board of directors. The plaintiff sued to recover the land and
the defendant contended that the contract, being approved by
the executive committee, gave the plaintiff no right of action.
The court stated that boards undoubtedly could appoint commit-
tees to transact the ordinary business of the corporation, but
they could not confer upon others the power to discharge duties
which involved the exercise of judgment and discretion.
Various other cases7 have held that "ministerial" functions
include execution of negotiable instruments,8 making ordinary
purchases on behalf of the company,9 assignment of notes of a
bank,' 0 and borrowing money and giving security." The courts'
reasoning in these earlier cases was that the delegation of dis-
cretionary duties would violate the directors' duty to manage.
In later years, courts tended to become much more liberal
in allowing delegation of duties which involved the use of dis-
cretion, particularly in instances where management was care-
(Continued from preceding page)
v. Walton Architectural Iron Co., 11 Ohio Dec. Reprint 904, 30 Weekly L. B.
382 (Super. Ct. of Cinc. 1893); Gale v. Canada A. & P. S.S. Co., 187 F. 598
(1st Cir. 1911); Hayes v. Canada A. & P. S.S. Co., 181 F. 289 (1st Cir. 1910);
Ryder v. Bushwick R.R. Co., 134 N. Y. 83, 31 N. E. 251 (1892); First Natl.
Bank of Binghamton v. Commercial Travelers' Home Ass'n. of America,
108 App. Div. 78, 95 N. Y. S. 454 (1905); Boss v. Alms & Doepke Co., 17
Ohio App. 314 (1923).
5 Ibid.
6 Supra n. 1.
7 Schwer, Delegation of Duties by Corporate Directors, 47 Va. L. Rev. 278,
279 (1961).
8 First NatI. Bank of Binghamton v. Commercial Travelers' Home Ass'n. of
America, supra n. 4; Tilden v. Goldy Mach. Co., 9 Cal. App. 9, 98 P. 39
(1908); Leavitt v. Oxford & Geneva Silver Mining Co., 3 Utah 265, 1 P. 356
(1883).
9 Conservation Co. v. Stimpson, 136 Md. 314, 110 A. 495 (1920); John Roe-
bling's Sons Co. v. Barre & Montpelier Traction & Power Co., supra n. 4.
10 Stevens v. Hill, 29 Me. 133 (1848); Northampton Bank v. Pepoon, 11
Mass. 288 (1814); Schwer, op. cit. supra n. 7.
11 In re Cincinnati Iron Store Co., 167 F. 486 (6th Cir. 1909).
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ful to retain general supervision over the corporate activities. 12
In the case of Dyer Bros. Golden West Iron Works v. Central
Iron Works'3 an executive committee had been formed, repre-
senting a number of corporations, which committee was delegated
the power exclusively to handle any labor disputes arising with
employees of the various companies over a period of three years.
The court held that this was not an undue delegation of dis-
cretionary executive functions of the directors as it was merely
delegation of full authority to handle one branch of the cor-
poration's affairs. In another case, Kennerson v. Burbank
Amusement Co., Inc.,14 a contract was entered into whereby the
board of directors attempted to transfer their control and man-
agement of substantially all corporate powers to the plaintiff, a
member of the board. The court held that merely requiring the
plaintiff to report back to the board was not sufficient retention
of control on their part and the contract was void.
Numerous instances of executive committees' taking over too
much power, usurping those functions which should properly re-
main with the board of directors, have been condemned by the
courts, some as being contrary to custom and others as violating
statutes requiring the board of directors to maintain control.
Such was the case in Hayes v. Canada, A. & P. S. S. Co.15 Here
the by-laws, which were stated in very broad terms, purported
to vest the executive committee with the "full powers of the
board of directors." The plaintiff contended that this expression
had no limitation at all and was a delegation of the entire powers
of the corporation for an indefinite period. The plaintiff here
was performing discretionary acts such as the determination of
annual salaries, the amendment of by-laws and the removal of of-
ficers. The court stated in its opinion: 16
It is certainly intolerable to maintain that the words
"full powers" in the provision for the appointment of the
executive committee, practically divested the directors of all
their functions, and built up a new foundation for it in lieu
of that formally established. Such an assumed absorption
of the powers of the creator by the created is too absurd to
receive the approbation of any court of law. * * * these
facts * * * exhibit in a concrete way * * * the impossibility
of giving force to the words "full powers" in the by-law re-
ferred to except with limitations restricting them to the
ordinary business transactions of the corporation.
12 Schwer, op. cit. supra n. 7 at 280; Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 729.
13 182 Cal. 588, 189 P. 445 (1920).
14 Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., Inc., 120 Cal. App. 2d, 260 P. 2d
823 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
15 Supra n. 4.
16 Ibid at 293.
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Current Provisions Re Delegation
Statutory provision for executive committees is common
today. 17 Many statutes expressly authorize delegation of au-
thority to executive and other committees.' 8 The Model Busi-
17 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 670-707, summarizing:
Ala. Code 1958, tit. 10, Sec. 21(29).
Alaska Stat. 10.05.192.
Ariz.-No statutory provision.
Ark. Stat. 1947, Sec. 64.402.
Calif. Corp. Code of 1947, Sec. 822.
Colo. Rev. Stat. 1953 as amended, Sec. 31-31-7.
Conn. Gen. Stat. 1958, Sec. 33-318 (c).
Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, Sec. 141.
Distr. of Columbia, D. C. Code 1961, Sec. 29-916 e.
Fla. Stat. Ann., Sec. 608.09.
Ga. Code Ann. Sec. 22-1867.
Hawaii-No statutory provision.
Idaho Code 1947-Sec. 30-139.
Ill. Rev. Stat. 1957, ch. 32, Sec. 157.38.
Ind. Burns' Stat. Sec. 25-208.
Iowa Code 1962, Sec. 496 A. 39.
Kan. Gen. Stat. 1949, Sec. 17-3101.
Ky. Rev. Stat. 1949, Sec. 271.345.
La. Rev. Stat. 1950, Sec. 12.34.
Me. Rev. Stat. 1954, Ch. 53, Sec. 32.
Md. Code 1957, Art. 23, Sec. 59.
Mass. Gen. Laws 1932, ch. 156, Sec. 26.
Mich. Comp. Laws 1948, Sec. 450.13.
Minn. Stat. 1953, Sec. 301.28.
Miss. Code 1942, Sec. 5309-77.
Mo. Stat. 1949, Sec. 351.330.
Mont.-No statutory provision.
Neb. Rev. Stat. 1943, Sec. 21-114.
Nev. Rev. Stat., Sec. 78.125.
N. H.-No statutory provision.
N. J. Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec. 14:7-4.
N. M. Stat. 1953, Sec. 51-2-14.
N. Y. Bus. Corp. Law, Sec. 712.
N. C. Gen. Stat. (1955 Act), Sec. 55-31.
N. D. Cent. Code Sec. 10-19-42.
Ohio Rev. Code (1955 Act), Sec. 1701.63.
Okl. Stat., 1951, tit. 18, Sec. 1.36.
Ore. Rev. Stat., 57.206.
Pa. Purdon's Stat., tit. 15, Sec. 2852-402.
Puerto Rico Laws Ann., tit. 14, Sec. 1401.
R. I. Gen. Laws 1956, Sec. 7-4-6.
S. C. Code 1962, Sec. 12-18.11.
S. D. Code 1939, Sec. 11.0707.
Tenn. Code Ann., Sec. 48-406.
Tex. Bus. Corp. Act of 1955, Art. 2.36.
Utah Code Ann. 1953, Sec. 16-10-39.
Vt. Stat. Ann., tit. 11, Sec. 223.
Va. Code 1950 (1956 act as amended), Sec. 13.1-40.
Wash. Rev. Code, Sec. 23.01.320.
W. Va. Code of 1931, Ch. 31, Art. 1, Sec. 16.
Wis. Stat. 1955, Sec. 180.36.
Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1957, Sec. 17-36.37.
Is Oleck, ibid.; and, Henn, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 343.
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ness Corporation Act provides for the formation of an executive
committee, defining specifically the limitations of delegation. 19
Provision for the appointment of executive committees is some-
times contained in the articles of incorporation, but more fre-
quently in the by-laws. 20 The construction of many of these
statutes and by-laws is so broad that they can easily be in-
terpreted in many instances as allowing the boards to pass on
all their authority in the management of the corporation. 21
The question under consideration is how far the directors'
delegation of authority should extend. Should the delegation
encompass only ordinary business transactions or should it in-
clude major policy decisions such as determining officers' salaries,
profit-sharing, additional compensation, amending by-laws, and
declaring dividends? 22 It is apparent that there are matters
which are so vital to the corporation's existence and involve such
a high degree of discretion that only the board should act on
them--decisions regarding hiring and removal of officers, de-
termining their salaries, declaring dividends, increasing and re-
ducing capital, borrowing money, instituting and defending suits,
filling vacancies on the board, and numerous others. 23 Decisions
in these areas should not be delegated. They are top-priority
problems and certainly important enough to the welfare of the
corporation that they should receive the attention of the entire
board.
The solution to the problem of how far duties can be prop-
erly delegated cannot be determined by any clearly defined
rules. No hard and fast line of distinction can be drawn, as is
evidenced by the latitude of the delegation in various cases.24
However, the purpose of an executive committee is to aid the
board of directors in its corporate managerial duties, and the
committees should not usurp those regular and vital functions
which ought to remain with the board.2 5
It is quite probable that currently many executive commit-
tees are exceeding the authority it originally was intended they
should exercise, and that they are taking over more power than
19 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act, Sec. 38; Henn, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 344.
20 Robinson v. Benbow, 298 F. 561 (4th Cir. 1924); 2 Fletcher, Private Cor-
porations, Sec. 549 (rev. ed. 1954); 19 C. J. S. Corporations, Sec. 760 (1940);
Ballantine, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 133; Oleck, op. cit. s-upra n. 3 at 728.
21 Lattin, Corporations, 223 (1959). Statutes-Colo., Conn., Del., D. C., Fla.,
Ga., Idaho, Ind., Mich., Neb., N. J., N. C., op. cit. supra n. 17.
22 Aiken v. Insull, 122 F. 2d 746 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 315 U. S. 806,
86 L. Ed. 1205; Ballantine, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 133.
23 Lattin, op. cit. supra n. 21 at 223.
24 Note, op. cit. supra n. 7 at 297.
25 Oleck, op. cit. supra n. 3 at 725; Ballantine, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 135.
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has or is ever likely to be upheld by the courts.2 6 Due to either
lack of time or interest or both on the part of boards of directors,
this situation frequently leads to boards becoming merely rati-
fying bodies which place their automatic stamp of approval on
any actions taken by these committees.27 The prevailing prac-
tice by committees of wielding unrestricted power in current
modern corporate management operations has led to the fol-
lowing statement: 28
Board committees . . . are often more active and of
more positive influence than the boards as a whole. Their
power of course stems from the tendency of boards to ap-
prove the recommendations of their committees. . . . Ap-
proval is typically almost routine in nature. As a conse-
quence a small group on a strategic committee may wield
a great deal of influence, particularly in the field of its
specialty. A small finance committee, for example, was
considered the main power in Armour & Co. of Illinois for a
decade.
Since it remains uncertain what powers are actually con-
ferred on executive committees by delegation of "all powers of
the board," the by-laws should clearly state what powers are in-
tended to be delegated, and the exceptions to the delegation
should be specified.2 9 Further, care should be taken that exec-
utive committees report fully and often to the boards of direc-
tors. Meetings of the full board should be scheduled frequently,
and detailed and thorough consideration should be given to
reports of these committees, in order to assure that the board
of directors fully performs its function of managing and directing
the affairs of the corporation.
26 Henn, op. cit. supra n. 2 at 344; Lattin, op. cit. supra n. 21 at 223; My-
lander, Management by Executive Committee, 33 Harv. Bus. Rev. 51, 53
(May-June 1955).
27 Ballantine, op. cit. supra n. 1 at 135.
28 Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 11, "Bu-
reaucracy and Trusteeship in Large Corporations" at p. 25 (1940); Lattin,
op. cit. supra n. 21 at 224.
29 Lattin, op. cit. supra n. 21 at 225.
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